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Abstract 
Corruption has been an important issue as it becomes obstacle to achieve the 
better and more efficient economic governmental system. The paper defines 
corruption in two ways, as state capture and administrative corruption to grasp 
the quintessence of the corruption cases modeled in dynamical computational 
social system. The result of experiments through simulation is provided in order 
to construct an understanding of structural properties of corruption, giving way to 
consider corruption not as an isolated phenomenon, but conclusively, as an 
interdisciplinary problem and should be handled in holistic perspectives.  
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….Now kings will rule and the poor will toil 
And tear their hands as they tear the soil 
But a day will come in this dawning age 
When an honest man sees an honest wage… 
Van Diemen’s Land – U2 
 
 
1. Corruption as Floated Signifier 
It is obvious that corruption is not an exclusively economic phenomenon. 
As described by Abed & Davoodi (2000), corruption manifests itself in many 
political processes, law and judicial system, and many less visible spheres. 
However, the most popular and probably simplest definition was coming from 
Tanzi (1998) that defined corruption as “the abuse of public power for private 
benefit”.  
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Corruption, however, is a difficult term to define. Gambetta (2000): 
 
Can we identify a specific social practice that we can justifiably call 
‘corruption’, and, if so, what are its distinct analytical properties? Given 
the multiplicity of definitions found in the literature and the considerable 
confusion over what exactly we should understand corruption to mean, 
this question, which forms the object of this essay, does neither have a 
straightforward or a formalistic answer. 
 
In many cases, corruption is a signifier referring to many phenomena. 
Most of literatures on corruption refer to many phenomena i.e.: bribery, collusion, 
nepotism, and so on. According to Berg (2001), corruption is the abuse of public 
power for private benefit, while the private benefit is often in the form of illicit 
money or in-kind from a client to the agent; we call this as bribery. Conclusively, 
the evaluation of the definition on corruption from many literatures evokes us to 
realize that the terminology of corruption is a floated signifier many terminologies 
should have point out.  
In advance, we can say that corruption is a symptom of the weakness of 
political, social, legal and economic systems. Even where corruption is 
widespread, the actor will strive to keep it hidden from public view. Corruption is 
not new, nor is it confined to any particular part of the world. On the contrary, 
corruption is a global phenomenon, although its severity varies from country to 
country.  
One important thing to note is that the different definitions on corruption 
eventually impact the way we measure and analyze a corrupt phenomena. Berg 
(2001) analyzed some different methods on measurement on corruption. Today, 
corruption is measured through surveys and polls of random sample from citizens 
or businesspeople; this is what can be called the method of subjective measures, 
although each of the subjective measurement employ distinguishable 
methodologies: the first based on the perceptions and the other based on 
experience. However, the paper will not discuss the methodologies of the 
measurement since the purpose of the paper is to find some general structural 
outline of corruption.  
The rest of the paper will construct analytical tools from the definition of 
corruption directed toward some practical cases. We will use analytical map of 
corruption (Gambetta, 2000) and the game-theoretic model of corruption in 
bureaucracies (Norris, 2000). Eventually, we will try to construct the dynamical 
model based on the definitions and the classifications described in the next 
section.  
 
 
3. What can we call corruption? 
To define what corruption is, we must analyze the social agent that 
involved in the process. According to Gambetta (2000), there are at least three 
agents involved in the corruption: agent (can be individual, such as an employer, 
or a collective body) relying on the expectation that people in certain positions 
are bound to follow given rules, one who agrees to act on behalf of the first 
agent, and the other whose interests are affected by the second agent’s actions. 
There are rules the second agent must obey as trusted by the first agent. 
However, the third agent wants the second agent to do improperly: to abuse the 
second agent’s trust from the first in order to gain benefit for her. For the sake of 
easier linguistic environment we will give three set of agents, the first agent is 
member of the set T, to give trust to the second agent. The second agent is 
member of the set G receiving obligation to play according to rules that tie G and 
T. However, during the process there will be the third agent, the member of the 
set P, try to attract member of G to violate the rule specified.  Once member of G 
agrees to do it, the corruption on abusing the authority occurs. We should note 
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that a corruption can only occur if and only if a certain relationship between 
members of T and members of G pre-exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our case members of T agree to entrust some resources or objects to 
members of G if the members of T expects the members of G to serve their 
interests. The members of T trust the members of G to do things whose outcome 
is x for T. The wrong deeds abusing the trust by members of G denoted by y will 
reduce outcome the members of T should obtain, since y>x. Obviously by 
abusing the trust, members of G gain more benefit. An act of corruption is then 
defined by the amount of some currency, say b*, received by members of G 
being persuaded by the members of P so the members of G abuse the trust they 
received. We can say that the value of b* fulfills  
 
y + b* > x 
 
This is the value motivating members of G to abuse the trust. Members of P can 
vary the value of b* so in return the members of G can reject the offer because it 
is too small relative to the cost they incur by doing the rule, or probably because 
their integrity: a moral keep them not to abuse the trust.  It is important to note 
that there should be an exchange between members of P and G then the corrupt 
action occurs.  
 Following the notions above, we can say that bribe (use of rewards to 
pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (patronage by 
reason of certain types of primordialism rather than capability), and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private regarding 
use) are aspects of corruption. A bribe to the police officer, the judge, or else can 
be classified as corruption since the members of P offer some currency to the 
members of G to break the law of the supreme power (the government, the 
representatives of the whole people, etc.). However, we should consider also that 
sometimes members of P offer bribe to G in order to have their own rights as 
citizens. For example, we should offer bribe to a trash-collector so he will take 
away our trash, or otherwise, he will not serve us well. In some developing 
countries such case is common. 
Such works like Hellman, et. al. (2000), Berg (2001), up to the works of 
the Transparency International (2003) and The Gallup Institute (1999) practically 
give us the structured perspectives of common people or citizens on corruption in 
various countries. The method applied is statistics to measure how the citizens 
perceived corruption in their society.  
One example is the cases of corruption in Indonesia. Researches by the 
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (2002) showed that corruption 
can be classified in two terms: 
T 
G P 
Figure 1 
The primitive model of corruption.  
The solid arrows represent things to be done according to rule of the game and 
the other represent situation when corruption occurs. 
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9 the Administrative Corruption, defined as intentional imposition by 
state or non-state actors to distort existing laws, policies, regulations 
for their own advantages. In our basic model, this case can be drawn 
as in figure 2a. There are some rights the citizens should enjoy as 
guaranteed by the authorities, but the officials abuse their 
authorities to gain as much advantages as they can.  
9 the state capture, defined as illegal actions by firms or individuals to 
influence the formulation of laws, policies, regulations for their own 
advantage. In many post-communist countries this kind of corruption 
can differ in two other classifiers (Hellman, et.al., 2000), i.e.: state 
capture (influence with illicit payment) and the influence (without 
illicit or non-transparent payment). In Indonesia, there is no 
complete literatures alike to justify the distinction the classifier 
indicates, thus we will use the term state capture applied to the rule 
of the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seeing the figure 2, we find that corruption in many cases should be viewed 
through the perspectives of the interactions between the members of G and P: 
there will always be two sides exchanging benefit and abusing the trust and 
authority pre-gained by one of them. In cases of administration corruption we can 
see bribe as the generic model. It affects someone’s right, the members of P 
whose connection with T must be actualized by interacting with G. In this type, 
the members of G abuse their positions and authority to gain benefit from the 
offer of the members of P. As explained above, the offer can be actualized for 
breaking the rule of service of members of P by members of G so it reduces the 
right to have service of members of P.  
 The second type is mostly found in unclear political system where 
members of P can influence the rule of the game contracted by the members of G 
and the members of T. The cases usually happen on the duties that should be 
fulfilled by members of P for the members of T, but in order to accomplish the 
duties, members of P should interact with the members of G. By actualizing this 
T 
G 
P trust 
services
rights 
x 
-x* 
Legal services received by P ~ x - x* 
T 
G 
P rules 
Change of 
rules 
duties 
Change of the rule by the abuse 
of authority 
(a) Structure of administrative corruption (b) Structure of state capture 
Figure 2 
The general structures of corruption occur in Indonesian society 
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mode of corruption, the members of P will reduce the duties they should 
accomplish according to the rule since they will influence the members of G to 
use their authority on changing the rule to give the most benefit they can get. 
Somehow, we can find the terminologies on collusion and nepotism 
inherently in the two types of corruption. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
they are the generic models of the practical corruptions. In the next section, we 
approach the dynamics and evolutionary corruptions by the two generic types. 
The static game-theoretic model of bureaucratic corruptions (Norris, 2000) can be 
seen as the more technical views of the two types of corruptions. 
  
 
4. The Dynamics of Corruption: Model Construction 
From the two types of corruption explained in the previous sections we 
understand that corruption can be seen as general form described in figure 1. 
Practically, we can classify corruptions as seen in figure 2; how the abuse of 
power misappropriates the rights or the duties contracted by the rule of the 
game. We construct a dynamical model to see some transitions or some changes 
in the social system regarding the corruption cases within. We build model based 
on the general model described on the figure 1 on varying parameters of social 
system by realizing that the figure 2 will only give us some details that can be 
seen succinctly in the general model. 
There are three groups of agents we will deal with. We isolate two 
interacting sets of constituents in the model (members of G and P) as corruption 
rises from these two sets of agents. The two set of agents interact each other in 
random order and sequences while there will be exchange of benefit between the 
two of them corrupting the rule of the game. We build subjectivity in every agent, 
i.e.: the memory to remember what has happened with her friends in the 
previous iterations, the preferences based on her morality, subjectivity on the 
system, whether or not she asks her partner to corrupt or do honestly.  
We use the simple pay-off matrix presented by Hammond (2000) with 
some modifications. In the model, we construct two sets of agents, representing 
members of G and the members of P. Each agent from each set interacts in the 
trust game based on the pay-off matrix pre-defined. Their neighbors and partners 
with whom she interact with is selected randomly as in figure 3. Each will get 
pay-off as the consequence of the choice or decision. Corruption will only occur 
when the two partners agree to do so. We should note that the agents are 
bounded rational on their expectations of the next turn choice.  
 
 
 
… …
… …
Honest agent Corrupt agent Jailed agent 
G 
P 
Neighbors (randomly selected)
Partners 
 (randomly 
selected) 
Figure 3 
The way the game roles. 
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There are two subjective considerations on every agent to choose whether 
to corrupt or not, i.e.:  
9 subjective thought whether or not her partner in the next round will agree 
to corrupt or not, denoted by F, based on the number of the matched 
corrupt partner that agreed to corrupt (e.g.: to accept or offer bribe) per 
the length of memory of each.  
 
F = -------------------------------- 
 
 
9 subjective thought whether or not she will be caught by the members of T 
that can sentence her to the jail for some certain rounds, C, assumed by 
the jailed friends (m), in her social network per corrupt friends in the last 
round (M).  
 
C = ------------------------ 
 
 
As figured in table 1, the biggest payoff value will be gained if both players 
choose to corrupt. Every agent in our system will be pre-given the honesty index, 
the index shows how corrupt one to be. Practically, we give the index by [0, 1] 
randomly among agents; the more dishonest an agent to be corrupt the closer 
the index to unity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Honesty index determines the expectation of each agent on every round’s 
pay-off. The closer the index to unity, the bigger the expectation of the agent, or 
the greedier the agent as follows: 
 
αα )1(* i−=  
 
where the α*I is the expectation of the corruption and i as the honesty index. 
By glancing at the pay-off matrix we can see that the game seems to be 
very simple, since α > β. By assuming the game as static, we can solve it and find 
the equilibrium, but under dynamical system, the game will show the complexity 
of the game, since there will be emergence in the collective state of all agents. In 
other words, the complexity of the game comes out from the uncertainty of each 
agent to choose whether corrupt or not.  
 Eventually, the agent uses limited information (the agent never knows and 
calculates the macro-state of the system) to choose as follows: 
 
βββα kCFFCxE −+−+−= )1(*)1()(  
 
where k  is the length of the jail term. If the expectation E(x) > β then the agent 
is greedy enough to do corruption. It is obvious that the agent builds up 
subjective perspectives on her environment to choose to corrupt or to be honest. 
The simulations of this model will bring us to the ability to answer some general 
points on corruption cases in society analytically.  
Matched corrupt Partners 
Memory 
Friends in Jail 
Corrupt Friends 
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5. Results of Simulations 
We do several experiments on the artificial corrupt society. The list of 
basic numerical variables is available in the appendix of the paper. We do some 
experiments based on the structures and some structural alternative solutions 
oftenly proposed to handle corruption. Our first experiment wants to test how the 
social system gets its evolutionary stable in which the variables used are at the 
basic values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 4, we can see that the population of P jailed more than the 
members of G, since in most cases of corruption, ordinary people is much easier 
to get caught of doing corruption than those who are members of the 
bureaucrats. The evolutionary stable conditions seem to make the corruptors 
remain to corrupt while the honest ones remain honest or are stimulated to 
corrupt. The simulation result reflects the algorithm employed here that the jailed 
corruptors will perform honestly right after she leave the jail while she can be 
corruptor again in the next round. That is why the population of corruptor is 
seemingly more stable than others in both graphs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
The first simulation result using the basic parameters on the artificial society 
Figure 5 
The performance of the system on the same jail period. There is a fast transition on the domination of 
honest agents and the corrupt one in the populations since the populations of P learn and fear of 
corruption the many of their friends jailed on corruption relative to the bureaucrats.   
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When we give the members of G longer length of jail period than the 
members of P as described in figure 6, the members of G then constitutes very 
corrupt bureaucracies with minimum jailed agents. This fact is followed by the 
dominant corrupt agents among the population of the jailed agents of P. This 
result concludes a common propositions saying that corrupt government will 
induced corrupt citizens. We should note also, that as has been proved by the 
previous work (Situngkir, 2003a), agent’s morality cannot become a major 
solution to combat corruption. In our simulation experiments we do not change 
and analyze the honesty index. As introduced before, the honesty index is pre-
defined parameter that will never change during the run of simulations.  
In our simulations, the corrupt culture in the members of G induces the 
corrupt behavior among the members of P do not care how honest the 
populations of P. This suggests that the combat of corruptions somehow should 
begin first from the law enforcement regarding all the populations of 
bureaucracies and then the citizens. The endeavor to combat corruption by 
campaigning to the people without law enforcement (as described in the next 
experiments) will eventually fail. This is emphasized by the next simulations in 
figure 7, where the length of the jail period of members of P is longer than the 
members of G. In other words, combating corruption should be done holistically.  
There is an alternative solution proposed by the common sense: if we give 
a chance to giant corruptors then spreading corruption among the whole people 
will follow. Our simulation shows that this is experimentally correct. When the 
highest authority (represented in our general model as members of the T) jails 
the giant corruptors (represented by the most often corruptors) there will be fast 
transitions from the corrupt regimes to the dominations of the honest and the 
lowest level of corrupted agents. This fact shows us that it is important to put the 
big corruptors in jail so other agents who corrupt will follow by rarely turning out 
to be honest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
The dominations of corruption in members of G on the longer jail period than the agents of P. 
The honest agents of P will be induced to be corrupted populations along with the corruptions in 
the bureaucracies (members of G). 
 9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eventually, we check computationally in our model whether a corruption 
regime will fail on the better pay-off for the honest. Practically, this is very 
popular in some developing countries to say that an important way to reduce 
corruption is to make the wages higher. However, as described in the beginning 
of the paper, we must understand that corruption is not merely economic 
problem. Corruption is linked to many aspects of the life of a society, including 
political, culture, and sociological aspects. In economics, a comprehensive agent-
based computational economics on corruption with the macro-economical aspects 
can be seen in Chakrabarti (2001). On this paradigm, the solutions to raise the 
wage comes from the assumption that corruption is merely an economic problem. 
A nice statistical analysis proving this proposition practically can be seen on the 
works by Rijkeghem & Weder (1997). 
As seen in figure 9, we can see that at raising the pay-off higher for an 
honest agent relative to the corrupt one will give no solution at all. The corrupt 
agents will still dominate among the member of G and P. This fact however 
demands the more holistic view on corruption and constructing alternatives to 
Figure 7 
The jail period among members of P is longer than G. Following the previous simulation result, the 
corrupt citizens are reflected by the dominance of jailed agents among bureaucracies. 
Figure 8 
The transitions among the two interacting populations. Law enforcement to put the most often corrupting 
agents in jail shifts the corrupt regime to the honest one. 
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combat it. Solving problem of corruption only economically will end up in nothing 
since corruption has rooted not only in economic properties of social system but 
also in many other aspects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Further Works & Concluding Remarks 
The corruption is defined as the abuse of authority and or power trusted to 
someone by means of gaining self-benefit offered by a third party who finds 
benefits from the abuse of the trust game. By this analysis we defined the 
administrative corruption and the state capture as the two basic types of 
corruption often happen.  Then we obtain general model of corruption by seeing 
the vested interests on abusing the legal proportions on duties and rights of 
citizens as depicted in both models.  
The computational simulation experiments performed shows that the 
dynamics of corruption touches the two interacting agents, i.e.: the trusted 
agents and the agents offering the abuse of the trust. Henceforth, the way to 
cope with corruption should also touch these two agents simultaneously. 
Forgetting one agent in the basic model will be giving no effect to the elimination 
of corruption. Thus, to see corruption correctly is to see it as a complex 
dynamical system in the complexity of social system. 
It is understood that the rule-mechanism of each agent is seemingly simple 
since the model presented here is constructed on the purpose of clarifying the 
general structural dynamics of corruption. To make the attributes of the agents to 
be more complicated in order to find more emergent phenomena is a challenging 
further work to be considered, i.e.: the use of some macroeconomic variables 
e.g.: inflation, economic growth, etc. This further works will enrich any policies 
made for reducing corruption practically. 
In general, we have shown that corruption should not also be seen in mono-
dimensional spectacles. The corruption is not merely economic phenomena but 
deeply rooted in many aspects of social dynamics, politically and economically 
embedded inside the culture of the entire people in all level of social hierarchies. 
Therefore, to eliminate corruption is to construct holistic strategies involving as 
wide as possible field of discourse. Corruption, however, is an interdisciplinary 
field of discussions.  
  
Figure 9 
The merely higher pay-off (or wage) to do honest relative to the corrupt one is not a good solution to 
combat corruption. This indicates a need to view corruption more holistically in order to construct the 
strategy to eliminate it. 
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Appendix 
 
The basic values used in the simulations of the Artificial Corrupt Societies: 
 
Pay-off to the corruption (α) 20 
Pay-off to being honest (β) 1 
Distribution of Honesty Index Randomly Distributed (Gaussian 
Distribution) among agents 
Number of Agents 75 members of P and 75 members of G 
Honesty Index [0..1] 
Length of jail period 5 rounds 
Social Network 5 agents 
Memory 3 
Probability to be caught 0.2 
Iterations 200 rounds 
  
Some of the basic values are changed to see the effect to the evolutionary stable 
conditions in the whole artificial social system. 
